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The Influence of  Teacher Unionization on 
Educational Outcomes: A Summarization 
of  the Research, Popular Methodologies, 
and Gaps in the Literature
Sarah Guthery
Texas A&M Commerce
Abstract
This paper summarizes the research on the relationship between teacher 
unionization and educational outcomes at the state, district, school, and in-
dividual (student) levels. Although teachers are the largest organized profes-
sionals in the United States, much of  educational policy literature has ignored 
unionization as a subject of  study. An emerging consensus from the literature 
believes that collective bargaining raises teacher pay, increases district expen-
diture and reduces class size; however, union influence on student outcomes 
has not yet been established. The literature is unclear as to whether or not 
teacher unionization is associated with student graduation rates or standard-
ized test scores.
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 Educational policy research 
often utilizes data sets that span 
multiple states to study policy effects 
on teacher pay,  student dropout 
rates, and student achievement. One 
variable of  interest that is frequently 
overlooked in a multi-state study is 
the presence of  a teacher union. The 
size, strength, and legal standing of  
a teacher’s union produce unique 
working conditions in the district 
where the union operates. Multistate 
studies that omit a unionization 
variable fail to control for preexist-
ing state conditions when trying to 
isolate policy outcomes. This paper 
summarizes the research on the 
relationship between teacher union-
ization and educational outcomes at 
the state, district, school, and indi-
vidual (student) levels. The following 
research questions are addressed: 
• How does the extent of  union-
ization influence outcomes, 
such as teacher pay and student 
achievement? 
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• What are the primary method-
ological and analytical traditions 
found in the published literature 
on the effects of  unionization on 
various educational outcomes? 
• What are the principal theoretical 
and conceptual traditions utilized 
in present efforts to understand 
the relationship? 
• What are the current gaps in our 
understanding of  the relationship 
between teacher unionization 
and educational outcomes and 
performance? 
 Teacher unionization has 
changed over time and is difficult to 
define. This paper first establishes 
what a “unionized” state is and how 
that is defined. Next, the popular 
theoretical and methodological tra-
ditions in union research are cov-
ered. Then, this paper summarizes 
key studies that link unionization to 
educational outcomes. Last, gaps in 
the literature are identified as well as 
possible future directions in research. 
Although teacher unions are often 
discussed in the educational policy 
realm, the academic literature has 
largely ignored unionization as a sub-
ject of  study (Kleiner, 1990; Lott & 
Kenny, 2013). This literature review 
examines the evidence linking teach-
er unions to educational outcomes 
as well as identifies areas yet to be 
explored. 
Background on Teachers’ Unions 
 The landscape of  teachers’ 
unions that is seen today is the result 
of  decades of  ever-evolving power 
sharing between states, districts, and 
teachers. In 1963, 93% of  the school 
districts in the US had active teacher 
organizations, but only 1% had a 
collective bargaining contract with 
its teachers (Hoxby, 1996). In con-
trast, the 1960s through the 1980s 
was a period of  rapid growth for the 
collective bargaining power of  teach-
ers’ unions (Hoxby, 1996). As states 
began allowing, and even requiring, 
collective bargaining, the number of  
teachers who worked under a con-
tract that resulted from collective 
bargaining had increased to 36% by 
1993. Hoxby found that the 1980s 
were a period of  rapid change and 
expansion for unions; however, the 
unionization changes had stabilized 
by 1990. 
 While most of  the education 
policy and funding decisions are 
made on the state and district level, 
there are two significant national 
teachers’ unions in the United States, 
the American Federation of  Teachers 
(AFT) and the National Educational 
Association (NEA) (Coulson, 2010; 
Duplantis, Chandler, & Geske, 1995; 
Steelman, Powell, & Carini, 2000). 
Both the AFT and the NEA are 
over one hundred years old, employ 
national lobbyists, and have members 
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in all 50 states. There are approx-
imately 3.5 million teachers in the 
United States, making teaching the 
largest unionized profession (Kleiner, 
2000). 
Unionization Across the States 
 Broadly, a teachers’ union 
is defined as a voting organization 
formed to represent teachers collec-
tively. Each state varies on the degree 
to which unionization is allowed, 
presenting a challenge as to whether 
or not a state is truly “unionized.” 
The unions have a unique legal 
standing in each state, and the extent 
to which a union can influence a 
particular issue can vary significantly 
across states. Several authors have 
divided the broad label of  ‘union-
ized’ into multiple categories of  
influence in order to avoid the di-
chotomous assignment of  unionized 
or non-unionized. There are three 
levels of  unionized states: mandatory 
bargaining states, union permissive 
states, and ‘right to work’ states (Du-
plantis et al., 1995; Lindy, 2011).
 According to an analysis by 
the National Council on Teacher 
Quality, the majority of  states fall 
into the strictest category of  pro-
tection for labor bargaining. Thirty 
states require that their districts 
collectively bargain with teachers and 
possess a state statute, which explic-
itly protects that right. Fifteen states 
allow individual districts to decide 
whether or not they will collective-
ly bargain with the teacher unions. 
Should they decide to bargain, these 
states have statutes that do not man-
date that they reach an agreement 
with the unions. Texas, Georgia, 
South Carolina, North Carolina and 
Virginia are the five states in which 
collective bargaining is explicitly pro-
hibited by statute in the state consti-
tution (National Council on Teacher 
Quality, n.d.). 
 Within the states that allow 
or require bargaining, there are labor 
topics that are explicitly provided for 
or outlawed by state statute during 
collective bargaining. For example, 
in Indiana, districts are required to 
collectively bargain for wages, but 
teachers’ hours are a prohibited item 
of  bargaining (National Council on 
Teacher Quality, n.d.). Comparisons 
across states are difficult because 
union influence is not equally ex-
pressed over the full range of  bar-
gaining issues, like hours, pay, class 
size or teacher tenure. In order to 
more precisely rank the influence 
of  unions in each state, many re-
searchers have attempted to define 
unionization in a variety of  ways. 
While the presence or absence of  a 
union contract is easy to measure, no 
consensus on the best way to count 
unionization exists. 
Union Models 
 The way researchers ap-
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proach union models can be con-
textualized in three important ways. 
The first way is to identify popular 
theoretical traditions in the union 
literature. The theoretical traditions 
are the ideological underpinnings 
of  the study. The second approach 
is to evaluate the methodological 
traditions that a study draws on to 
analyze the data in the studies. The 
third method is to analyze how the 
author decides to count unionization. 
The decisions authors make in these 
three areas are critical to the framing 
and findings of  the studies. After a 
discussion of  relevant studies on the 
topic, the most influential method-
ological and theoretical traditions are 
summarized. 
Theoretical Traditions 
 There are several common 
theoretical frameworks underlying 
many models in the teacher union 
literature: rent-seeking behavior, 
appealing to the median voter model, 
and Tiebout sorting. The premise 
of  rent-seeking is that an organiza-
tion will act in its own best interest 
(Krueger, 1974). When an author 
questions whether unions benefit 
themselves or the students, the the-
oretical underpinning for the model 
is rent-seeking. If  a union is found 
to be rent-seeking, it would pur-
sue higher pay, smaller classes, and 
strong tenure with no corresponding 
increase in quality. In rent-seeking 
unions, teacher conditions would im-
prove; however, the students would 
not be better off, leading to the con-
clusion the policies were pursued out 
of  self-interest. Union studies that 
question if  the changes are beneficial 
for the students or the teachers are 
usually testing this theory. Rose and 
Stonstelie (2010) and Lindy (2011) 
utilized a  rent-seeking framework as 
the premise of  their papers, as they 
investigated teacher unions. 
 The median voter model 
states that a voting organization 
will appeal to the median of  their 
population to maintain a majority 
of  votes. Winters (2011) built upon 
this theoretical model to explain the 
union’s defense of  advanced degrees 
and teacher tenure. The union, in 
this case, is appealing to their median 
voter, or the average teacher. In an 
effort to appease the median voter, 
the voting organization will pursue 
policies that will be popular with the 
typical voter. 
 Finally, the Tiebout sorting 
theory suggests that people “vote 
with their feet,” and if  people are 
unhappy with their district, they will 
move. Thus, the deserted district will 
be forced to compete and improve 
quality to win people back, or the 
district offering the more desirable 
education will attract more people. 
Lovenheim (2009) used this theory 
to study outcomes of  unionization. 
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Methodological Traditions 
 When examining the effect 
of  unions, several popular meth-
odological traditions are discussed 
in the union literature—differ-
ence-in-difference or the statistically 
similar panel data with fixed effects 
(Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009). 
Difference-in-difference captures 
existing differences and subtracts 
them from the beginning and end 
time points to neutralize a difference 
that may exist from the outset. Panel 
data with fixed effects is very similar, 
but difference-in-difference has two 
groups compared at two points in 
time. Panel data with fixed effects 
allows multiple groups at multiple 
points in time to be analyzed (Lin-
dy, 2011). Generalized Method of  
Moments (GMM) is a regression 
where certain variables can be frozen 
and treated as a constant and, thus, 
factored out while maintaining the 
consistency and asymptotically 
normal properties of  the estimator 
(Winters, 2011). Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is also frequently used 
as well as regression with Instrumen-
tal Variables (Duplantis et al., 1995; 
Lott & Kenny, 2013; Moe, 2009; 
Rose & Stonstelie, 2010; Steelman et 
al., 2000). 
Methods for Calculating 
Unionization
 Since no consensus in the 
field is currently established on the 
meaning of  ‘unionized’, several 
different ways are used to determine 
if  a state is unionized. In a seminal 
paper, Hoxby (1996) used a dummy 
variable for union presence in a state. 
Other researchers have since tried 
to quantify the strength of  union 
presence on a variety of  dimensions. 
Methods for obtaining a continu-
ous rather than discrete measure of  
union strength include: a measure 
of  financial power (Lott & Kenny, 
2013), the percentage of  a district or 
state that is a member (Duplantis et 
al., 1995; Steelman et al., 2000; Win-
ters, 2011), the percentage of  vot-
ers in union elections (Lovenheim, 
2009), union friendly laws (Hoxby 
& Leigh, 2004), and a composite 
of  multiple dimensions of  influ-
ence (Moe, 2009; Rose & Stonstelie, 
2010). States that appear strong on 
one metric may be weak on another, 
making an overall measure hard to 
obtain. From the literature, common 
metric that is widely accepted as a 
measure of  union power has yet to 
be developed. 
 There are two other con-
siderations that must be addressed 
when constructing a union model. 
The first issue is how to handle the 
data from Hawaii, as the whole state 
is one district with a strong union, 
resulting in a bilateral monopoly 
that does not exist in any other state 
(Winker, Scull, & Zeehandelaar, 
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2012). The second concern is prop-
erly controlling for the demographic 
difference in the South and the lack 
of  teacher unions throughout that 
region. Even after controlling for de-
mographics (race, percentage taking 
the test, parent education, and pov-
erty), the South is still a statistically 
significant predictor of  SAT scores 
(Steelman et al., 2000). 
Union Presence and Student 
Outcomes 
 Several authors have attempt-
ed to quantify union influence on 
popular outcome metrics for stu-
dent and school performance. Some 
authors have measured teacher union 
influence on student level outcomes, 
such as student graduation rates and 
student achievement., ther authors 
have focused on the district and 
school level outcome variables, like 
class size and district expenditure. 
The following section examines the 
evidence available on how a union 
affects its associated districts and 
students. 
District Outcome: Expenditure 
and Class Size 
 A popular question in union 
research centers on if  district expen-
diture is influenced in the presence 
of  unions (Duplantis et al., 1995; 
Hoxby, 1996; Lovenheim, 2009; 
Winters, 2011). Class size has also 
been included as a proxy measure 
for district expenditure because of  
the cost of  increased staffing (Rose 
& Stonstelie 2010). In a seminal 
paper, Hoxby (1996) examined why 
school production functions were 
positive before 1960, and increas-
ing expenditure has had little to no 
effect thereafter on school achieve-
ment. This discovery means teachers 
could be modeled in an equation 
to show positive achievement gains 
for every dollar spent on a teacher’s 
salary. Hoxby tested the hypothesis 
that unions could be one factor for 
the increasing, yet nonproductive, 
allocation of  resources in schools 
by analyzing panel data from 10,509 
districts, the National Bureau of  
Economic Research (NBER) and the 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
dataset, using difference-indifference. 
The most significant contribution of  
this study was the size, methodology 
and detail. The measure for school 
achievement was the high school 
dropout rate (16–19 not in school 
and no degree). A dummy variable 
was used for unionization in the time 
period a district unionized. A dis-
trict was coded ‘unionized’ if  at least 
50% of  the teachers were members 
and the district teaching contract 
was a result of  collective bargaining. 
The study showed that the presence 
of  unions increases the amount of  
district per pupil spending by 3%. 
Then, Hoxby (1996) used a passage 
of  statewide laws as an Instrumental 
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Variable (IV), or proxy for union-
ization. Reanalyzing the data using 
difference-in-difference on the data 
with IVs, Hoxby (1996) found that 
per pupil expenditure increased by 
12.3%, fortifying the original conclu-
sion that per pupil spending increas-
es are linked to unionization, even 
more than previous research had 
shown. 
 Duplantis et al. (1995) con-
ducted a cross-sectional study on 11 
states without collective bargaining 
provisions to determine the differ-
ence in teacher pay between union 
and nonunion districts. This analysis 
yielded corroborating results to the 
aforementioned studies. Analyz-
ing only districts with over 10,000 
students in 11 states using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), the authors 
found that having a collective bar-
gaining agreement in place is associ-
ated with a 15.5% increase in district 
spending (Duplantis, et al., 1995). 
 In response to studies show-
ing unions increased district spend-
ing, Lovenheim (2009) cited Hoxby 
(1996) as a basis for research; but, 
where Hoxby coded unionization 
as a dummy variable, Lovenheim, 
instead, measured union strength 
by paper ballots cast in union elec-
tions with an interaction of  length 
of  unionization. Hypothesizing that 
unions have no impact on teacher 
pay or per student district expendi-
tures, the outcome variable of  high 
school dropouts was used (as Hoxby 
did) as a proxy for district achieve-
ment;however, the rate was slightly 
altered to include 14- to 18-year-olds. 
Lovenheim (2009) hand collected 
paper ballots cast for union leaders 
in Iowa, Minnesota and Indiana. 
This method was believed to be 
a more effective proxy for union 
strength because it captured active 
union activity in a district, thus the 
likelihood that the union influenced 
policy (Lovenheim, 2009). Using 
nonparametric regression on the 
original Hoxby question, the result 
was that unions are correlated with 
increased spending but do not have 
a statistically significant impact on 
per-student district expenditures 
given the strength or length of  union 
presence (Lovenheim, 2009). As 
union participation increased, district 
spending also tended to increase. As 
the district spent more money on 
their students, neighboring students 
began to enter the district because of  
the Tiebout effect and increased the 
enrollment, which reduced the per 
pupil expenditure ratio (Lovenheim, 
2009). 
 In a natural experiment in 
New Mexico, Lindy (2011) found 
that the presence of  unions has no 
effect on the per pupil expenditure. 
Lindy exploited a natural experiment 
(where there is a naturally occurring, 
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non-experimental disruption to the 
variable of  interest, which provides 
the researcher the opportunity to 
study the effect of  the change with 
the same population) to examine 
unions before and after the legaliza-
tion of  unions in New Mexico. The 
result is in line with previous findings 
that unions do not appear to change 
per pupil expenditure.
 Confirming the majority of  
findings, Rose & Stonstelie (2010) 
found that unions do decrease class 
size. By randomly sampling 771 out 
of  982 districts in California during 
the 1999-2000 school year and using 
OLS (with and without IV) and 2 
Stage-Least-Squares, the authors 
found that, when controlling for 
demographics, larger unions yielded 
smaller class sizes with a lower ratio 
of  pupils to teachers. The average 
class size is expected to be 1.2 stu-
dents less in a large district compared 
to an average sized district (Rose & 
Stonstelie, 2010). The authors attri-
bute this difference to the strength 
of  the union in the larger district. 
District Outcome: Teacher Pay 
 A growing body of  evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the 
presence of  a union increases teacher 
pay (Duplantis, et al., 1995; Hoxby, 
1996; Rose & Stonstelie, 2010). Du-
plantis et al. (1995) found teachers 
working under a collective bargaining 
agreement earned 9.5% more than 
their counterparts in districts without 
one. Hoxby (1996) found that teach-
ers who unionize get an increase of  
three to five percent in the time peri-
od for which they are unionizing, and 
this increase has a lagged effect of  
increasing pay compared to districts 
that unionize later, or never do. 
 Contrary to the previous 
findings, Lovenheim (2009) found 
that the strength of  a union does not 
alter teacher pay, which is interest-
ing because one of  the top reasons 
teachers give for being in a union is 
to raise pay. Lovenheim (2009) also 
concluded that teachers’ salaries were 
not found to increase in the long or 
short run due to unionization. 
 Winters (2011) examined the 
salary of  experienced and inexperi-
enced teachers based on the median 
voter model. Using this model, the 
author was interested in how union 
and nonunion districts prioritized 
the teacher pay scale. According to 
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), 
the average teacher has fifteen years 
experience and an advanced degree. 
The median voter model theoriz-
es that unions would appeal to the 
median of  their membership thus 
likely to favor policies that benefit 
the majority of  members, in this 
case, experienced teachers. Linking 
three datasets (SASS, School District 
Demographic system and the Bu-
reau of  Labor Statistics) from 4,237 
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districts in the forty-eight contiguous 
states, union activity was measured 
by the legal status of  collective 
bargaining and membership density; 
the data was analyzed with General-
ized Method of  Moments (GMM). 
The author found that, in districts 
with weak unions, the pay structure 
favors new hires (Winters, 2011). In 
districts with a strong union, the pay 
structure favors experience and ad-
vanced degrees. Controlling for the 
strength of  the union and spillover 
effects from neighboring districts, 
teachers with experience earned up 
to 18–28% more than inexperienced 
teachers (Winters, 2011). 
Student Outcome: High School 
Dropout Rate 
 Union presence is correlated 
with an increased number of  high 
school dropouts; thus, when used 
as a proxy for school effectiveness, 
teacher unions appear to have a neg-
ative impact on student persistence 
(Hoxby, 1996; Lindy, 2011, Steel-
man, et al., 2000). Lovenheim (2009) 
found that there was a small decrease 
in high school graduation rates in the 
short run but no statistically signif-
icant effect of  unions on dropouts 
in the long run. When comparing 
the means of  districts that unionize 
with those that never do, Lovenheim 
(2009) found that non-unionized 
districts tend to be smaller and more 
rural with a higher poverty rate and 
fewer high school dropouts. The 
finding that union presence is more 
likely in an area with more high 
school dropouts indicates that, if  
unionization is used as a predictor 
for the dropout rate, endogeneity 
in the equation. Whatever triggers 
unionization within a population, 
something else simultaneously 
occurs,increasing the high school 
dropout rate. Therefore, studies that 
do not disentangle the simultaneous 
occurrence of  the high school drop-
out rate and union presence will like-
ly find that union presence decreases 
student persistence in high school. 
Student Outcome: Achievement 
on Standardized Tests 
 A consensus has not been 
reached within the literature about 
the impact of  unions on student 
achievement, in large, because of  
the variety of  ways that unionization 
and achievement are defined. Sever-
al studies have tested for a possible 
relationship between union presence 
and student achievement. 
 Lott & Kenny (2013) au-
thored a study of  large districts (at 
least 10,000 students) in forty-two 
states. They operationalized union 
presence by monetary union dues. 
The authors regressed the dollar 
amount of  union dues on reading 
and math scores in fourth grade. 
They found that students in states 
with the highest union dues (union 
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dues divided over the number of  
teachers and the number of  stu-
dents) had the lowest fourth grade 
test scores. 
 Two studies (Moe, 2009; 
Rose & Stonstelie, 2010) used the 
California Academic Performance 
Index (API) as a proxy for achieve-
ment. The API is a rating given to 
a California school on a scale of  
200–1000. This number is a compila-
tion score for yearly test achievement 
and test score growth. A measure 
is also reported for how well sub-
populations are achieving within 
the school. Using the sum of  the 
API outcome over four years, when 
teacher contracts were coded (using 
factor analysis), the more restrictive 
a teacher contract is to the district, 
the lower the API (Moe, 2009). In 
another study that measured union 
strength by size in California, the 
API scores in large districts with 
active unions were 3% lower than the 
average district score (Rose & Son-
stelie, 2010). 
 Carini (2008) used data from 
the National Educational Longitu-
dinal Study (NELS) from 1988 and 
1990 to analyze test scores from 
10,799 students. Prior knowledge 
was controlled for using the eighth 
grade test score, and the outcome 
measure was the history, reading, 
math and science standardized tenth 
grade test. Using OLS, Carini deter-
mined that in the first model, unions 
were associated with higher test 
scores; however, when further itera-
tions of  the models were run and all 
the controls were added, the effect 
size became insignificant. 
 When SAT and ACT scores 
are used as the proxy for achieve-
ment, unions do appear to positive-
ly influence scores. Lindy (2011) 
examined what happened when legal 
collective bargaining was prohibited 
and then reinstated in New Mexico. 
In 1999, the policy sunset on Col-
lective Bargaining Rights; then, the 
subsequent 2003 Reauthorization of  
Collective Bargaining Rights pro-
vided a natural experiment to test 
the effect of  unions on achievement 
longitudinally. Lindy (2011) analyzed 
panel data with fixed effects and 
found that the SAT scores of  New 
Mexico students rose after the rein-
statement of  collective bargaining. 
 Similarly, Steelman et al. 
(2000) found that when controlling 
for demographics in the south, the 
SAT and ACT scores were raised in 
the presence of  a higher percentage 
of  teachers and staff  in unions. This 
finding was key because the South 
has unique regional characteristics 
that can be overrepresented in the 
nonunion sample, as the South is the 
only region where unions are illegal. 
 K–12 achievement tests 
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can be difficult to compare across 
states because of  the variation in 
standards and testing. In an attempt 
to work around this bias, SAT and 
ACT scores are used for proxies of  
achievement (Steelman, et al., 2000; 
Lindy, 2011); however, the state 
participation rate of  eligible students 
on the SAT and ACT is a strong 
predictor of  test scores (Powell & 
Steelman, 1996). If  a state recruits 
more minorities and low socioeco-
nomic status test takers in K–12, 
then, more likely, the scores will be 
lower because the percentage of  
wealthy, white college bound stu-
dents taking the test will be lower 
(Powell & Steelman, 1996). Measur-
ing unionization effects on student 
achievement with the SAT and ACT 
as a proxy for student achievement 
has the added problem of  unioniza-
tion being correlated with states that 
have a slightly higher dropout rate 
(Hoxby, 1996; Lindy, 2011, Steelman, 
et al., 2000, Lovenheim, 2009). As a 
result, one would expect that, when 
measuring the influence of  union-
ization with SAT and ACT scores, a 
strong sorting effect has taken place 
in those states prior to the exam. 
 Further complicating matters, 
the level at which student achieve-
ment is operationalized has an 
impact on the outcome of  the study. 
Carini (2008) concluded that studies 
where the data is highly aggregated 
to calculate student achievement are 
more likely to find negative effects 
of  unionization than studies that use 
student level data. 
Gaps in the Literature and Future 
Directions 
 Many studies have estab-
lished a relationship between union-
ization and a variety of  educational 
outcomes. Given that a variety of  
authors have found that unionization 
does have an impact on a multitude 
of  educational outcomes, adding 
unionization as a control variable in 
future studies may improve policy 
models. Unfortunately, defining 
unionization is difficult, as the degree 
to which a state is unionized varies 
by district. Two studies propose a 
new method of  calculating union 
strength for future research. 
 First, a joint study from the 
Fordham Institute and Education 
Reform Now ranks the 50 states 
across multiple dimensions of  union 
strength (Winker, et al., 2012). This 
detailed 400-page analysis ranks the 
states by 37 variables across five 
dimensions of  union influence. The 
authors findings generally support 
the division of  states by the three 
bands of  bargaining with the notable 
exception of  North Carolina, which 
was ranked in the fourth, not the 
bottom fifth, tier even though col-
lective bargaining is illegal in those 
districts (Winker et al., 2012). This 
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report is one of  the most exten-
sive attempts to rank union power 
across states; however, the rankings 
have yet to be used by a researcher 
as the definition of  union influence 
in a research study. This preexisting 
measure would be interesting to test 
for union influence on education-
al outcomes, considering there are 
measures in multiple domains as well 
as an overall score for the state. 
 The second study used Cali-
fornia district data to analyze union 
strength using district contracts 
(Strunk & Reardon, 2010). The au-
thors applied test theory to contract 
items in districts to come up with 
a reliable score for union strength. 
This Partial Independence Item 
Response model looks at how rare an 
item is in district contracts and, then, 
ranks the items from least to most 
restrictive based on how rarely each 
appears in district contracts. Their 
latent trait model produced a ranking 
of  39 bargaining items in California 
teacher contracts that could be an-
other useful preexisting measure for 
future research. 
 Further research is needed 
to develop more nuanced measures 
of  teacher unionization. Because no 
consensus exists in the literature on 
how to measure union presence in a 
state, assessing preexisting measures 
of  union strength is difficult. The 
effect of  teacher unions on school 
outcomes is largely dependent upon 
the definition of  unionization and 
the outcome measure selected; how-
ever, the future direction in the field 
is toward multiple measures of  union 
strength. 
Conclusion 
 Teacher unionization is a crit-
ical component of  education policy 
in almost every state. The conclusion 
from the literature is that a relation-
ship between teacher unionization 
and educational outcomes is evident 
at the various levels of  education. 
Further, large-scale policy analy-
ses that do not account for teacher 
unionization may be attributing 
differential policy effects to causes 
other than unionization. Theoreti-
cal models that control for teacher 
union strength are likely closer to 
accounting for the true policy climate 
in each state. 
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